





Member States’ interests and EU law: Filtering, moderating, and transforming? 
 
Abstract: 
This article investigates the engagement of EU law with the interests represented and pursued 
by the Member States within the framework of the European Union. In principle, because the 
interests which the Member States feed into the EU governance machinery are formulated in 
political processes at the national level, and thus possess paramount political legitimacy, EU 
law may only interact with those interests when a clear and sufficient mandate has been 
provided for doing so. Such mandates follow from Treaty provisions or EU legislation. They 
embody common political agreements among the Member States by which they commit 
themselves to realising the specific interests they share, as well as achieving related common 
policy objectives. In practice, however, the boundaries of EU law’s mandate are difficult to 
determine with precision, and this may weaken the legitimacy of EU law interventions. The 
weaker legitimacy of the law raises particular problems in the law of the Single Market, 
where the interests pursued by national governments are subjected to filtering, moderation, 
and even transformation by the Court of Justice. 
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Introduction 
This article examines the ways in which Member State interests and EU law interact with 
each other. The former is understood here as the political basis of cooperation within the EU, 
while the latter was put in place – in part – to control the conduct of Member States. The 
article analyses in particular the legitimacy of EU law’s engagement with the interests 
pursued by the Member States in the Union. The interests of the Member States are the 
products of national political processes and relate to locally-defined needs, and therefore they 
enjoy a robust political legitimacy. As a result, when EU law interferes with them it needs to 
rely, as a matter of principle, on a clear legally expressed mandate. Such mandates are 
provided by the Treaties and EU legislation; they express a previous political agreement 
among the Member States concerning their shared commitment to the implementation of 
common (policy) objectives. However, practice demonstrates – in particular in the domain of 
the Single Market, where the law interacts with local interests perhaps the most markedly – 
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that defining that mandate and determining its boundaries may be difficult to achieve, which 
then raises questions about the legitimacy of the law, as applied by the Court of Justice, in 
filtering and moderating Member States’ interests, and even transforming them. 
Our analysis is structured as follows. The article begins by introducing Member State 
interests, on the basis of the legal and non-legal literature as well as the most relevant Treaty 
provisions, as a central politico-legal concept and component of inter-State cooperation in the 
EU. This provides the basis for the ensuing discussion concerning the mandate available to 
EU law when it engages with the local interests brought within the EU’s framework. In its 
second part, the article examines legal developments in the domain of the law of the Single 
Market, in particular relevant cases before the Court of Justice, where the legal scrutiny 
applied to the interests pursued by the Member States raises issues as regards EU law’s 
above-mentioned mandate and its boundaries. It analyses, in particular, how EU law separates 
legitimate Member State interests from illegitimate ones, and how it moderates and, 
potentially, transforms local interests under the requirements arising from the principle of 
proportionality. This article is not aimed at challenging the basic premises of the EU legal 
order as developed in the jurisprudence and accepted in legal scholarship. Rather, it suggests 
their re-examination from the analytical perspective offered by the political concept of 
Member State interests. 
 
1. Member State interests and EU law  
The core objective of EU law, as defined by the Court of Justice,
1
 is to confine, under the 
framework of common policies, unilateral Member State actions pursuing territorially defined 
economic and social interests. In this framework, EU law may appear as superimposed, with 
nearly absolute force, over considerations of local interest. Its application and enforcement 
seems unaffected by questions of legitimacy raised with respect to the policing of the conduct 
of sovereign States. The formalism of EU law’s doctrinal construction had, however, the 
consequence of disconnecting the interaction between EU legal obligations and the interests 
of the Member States from the historical and political circumstances of European integration. 
This, in our view, was a problematic development because, as has been forcefully, argued EU 
integration, as well as the creation and implementation of common policies and the legal 
obligations formulated thereunder, cannot be separated from the interests of the Member 
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States nor be examined without accepting their influence on those processes.
2
 The direct 
linkage between Member State interests and the objectives of the Union,
3
 and their overlaps 
as well as their potential mutuality, have been characterised as an essential condition of 
European integration,
4
 whereby locally-defined interests dictate political and policy 
developments.
5
 It has also been argued that the EU political process is driven by interests that 
emerge from the preferences, constraints, and opportunities presented in the national political 
arena,
6
 and that its aim is, ultimately, to develop inter-State (supranational) responses to needs 
defined in the territories of the Member States.
78
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If this entanglement of local interests and common policy frameworks in the EU is 
accepted as valid, then EU law’s engagement with Member State interests necessitates a 
constant examination and validation as a matter of its legitimacy. More specifically, the robust 
political legitimacy of Member State interests, within and outside the EU political and legal 
framework, requires that an equally robust mandate is available for EU law and its application 
and enforcement. The interests of the Member States are products of national political 
processes and are represented under local political mandates and political responsibility 
towards the local electorate.
9
 There is plenty of evidence that local interests, as well as their 
diversity, directly and fundamentally influence the EU decision-making process and the 
resulting common policy frameworks, as well as the legal obligations adopted for their 
implementation.
10
 Viewed in this light, the authorisation for EU law – as applied by both the 
Court of Justice and by national authorities and courts – to interfere with Member State 
interests needs to come from a political process in which the Member States reach common 
agreements, and must be expressed clearly, preferably in specific legal provisions. 
The EU legal order contains a wide variety of rules which express both general and more 
specific politically agreed undertakings by the Member States to realise shared objectives and 
develop and operate corresponding common policy frameworks. These legal rules, which are 
included in both the Treaties and in legislation adopted under the Treaties should, in principle, 
secure a sufficient mandate for EU law to interact with locally-rooted interests. The 
legitimacy they may lend to EU action is further enhanced by the circumstance that they 
originate from the local interests which were brought by the Member States themselves to the 
EU framework and were negotiated among them with a view toward reaching a common 
agreement on the objectives of EU policy actions and their implementation.
11
 From this 
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perspective, EU law’s engagement with the particular interests of the Member States entails, 
in effect, the settling of conflicts between prior agreed-upon common commitments based on 
local interests and the particular interests raised subsequently by individual Member States. 
This means that the interactions between EU law and Member State interests are not governed 
by according an automatic preference for European politics and decision-making over the 
national, and vice versa, but rather in a process where the competing political mandates 
should be continuously examined and validated.
12
 
In the Treaties, the most general recognition of the role played by Member State interests 
in European integration, as well as in the construction and operation of the EU’s policies, is 
found in Art. 1(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) It expresses primarily that the 
locally-defined interests of the Member States provide the basis of common actions and 
policies under the EU framework. It also indicates that the Member States have agreed, in 
general terms, to act (i.e. to pursue certain of their interests) under a common framework. This 
latter component of Art. 1(1) may well be interpreted as offering EU law with the most 
general of mandates to engage with local interests. Art. 1(1) TEU holds that the Member 
States created “among themselves” the European Union, on which they conferred 
competences “to attain objectives they have in common.” This can be interpreted as referring 
to a prior act by the Member States which elevates their shared interests to the European 
level
13
 and agreeing on common actions introduced under very real powers to realise those 
interests. As an important characteristic of that common agreement, Art. 1(1) stresses that it 
was voluntary and that the obligation on the part of the Member States to cooperate under a 
common framework was self-imposed.
14
 
                                                                                                                                                        
safeguarding particular local interests from the restrictions arising from the implementation of those common 
objectives. 
12
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Foundations of European Union Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2012, pp. 139-140. This decision by 
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The Treaties also contain so-called “constitutionalising elements”,15 which can be 
regarded as providing general bases, beyond Art. 1(1) TEU, for the EU law’s mandate to 
interact with the interests of individual Member States. This term was introduced by 
Dashwood to distinguish these provisions from the so-called “conservatory elements” of the 
Treaties, the latter of which were placed in the Treaties with the purpose of preserving the 
position of the Member States within the Union.
16
 “Constitutionalising elements” were 
defined as covering provisions that are available to promote and consolidate the interests of 
the Union and protect them – in law – against the disintegrative effects of the Member States 
acting unilaterally in the pursuit of their own interests.
17
 These Treaty components,
18
 
including the principle of loyalty under Art. 4(3) TEU – which are interpreted and applied 
together with individual legal provisions that formulate specific Member State obligations in 
concrete policy areas – enable the policing of conduct of the Member States in the Union and 
authorise the scrutiny by the EU of those local interests which are formulated, often in 
contradiction with EU obligations, in the national political arena. 
More specific manifestations of a common political will among the Member States to 
pursue together their shared interests can be found in other Treaty provisions, such as Art. 18 
of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU) or those containing the 
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 In essence, they exclude the unilateral promotion of the territorially-
bound interests of individual Member States at the expense of either the shared interests 




An even more robust mandate may follow from EU legislation. EU secondary law is 
based on a clear political agreement among the Member States in a specific area, and on that 
basis formulates concrete commitments.
21
 EU legislative measures may lend detail to the 
political will expressed at Treaty-level, or secure the necessary implementation foreseen in the 
Treaty provisions. Generally speaking, their provisions can secure a more enhanced 
legitimacy to EU law’s intervention than legal mandates which require further clarification by 
means of judicial interpretation. The Court of Justice has recognised that when the Treaties 
regulate a detailed implementation strategy for a particular provision, as in case of freedom of 
establishment under Art. 49 TFEU, the results to be achieved by EU law must primarily 
follow from the measures negotiated and agreed upon by the Member States.
22
 
The earlier-mentioned “conservatory elements” of the Treaties, which focus on the 
position maintained by the Member States within the Union, in effect give further expression 
to the fundamental circumstance recognised in Art. 1(1) TEU, i.e. that the shared interests 
pursued in the EU have been formulated in the national political process and are represented 
under territorially-defined political mandates.
23
 The first of these – Art. 4(2) TEU – anchors 
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States. See, inter alia, Case 26/62 NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v 
Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, EU:C:1963:1; and after the expiry of the transitional period 
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method of implementation of common policies. See, inter alia, Case 2/74 Reyners, paras. 18-23; Joined Cases C-
163, C-165 and C-250/94 Criminal proceedings against Lucas Emilio Sanz de Lera, Raimundo Díaz Jiménez 
and Figen Kapanoglu, EU:C:1995:451, paras. 41-47; Case 4/88 Lambregts Transportbedrijf PVBA v Belgian 
State, EU:C:1989:320, paras. 8-9; Case C-49/89 Corsica Ferries France v Direction générale des douanes 
françaises, EU:C:1989:649, paras. 7-10. 
22
 See Art. 50 TFEU and Case C-313/01 Christine Morgenbesser v Consiglio dell'Ordine degli avvocati di 
Genova, EU:C:2003:612, para. 55 (in connection with the applicability of the Vlassopoulou-principle). 
23
 See the overview of the various principles and instruments available to safeguard the status of the Member 
States within the EU in Dashwood, supra note 12, pp. 206-213. 
  
the relevance of the local by providing that the national identities (and essential state 
functions) formulated within the territorial confines of the Member States must be protected. 
The national political arena is given further recognition under the rules governing the EU’s 
system of competences, including the principle of conferral in Art. 5(1) TEU and the principle 
of subsidiarity in Art. 5(3) TEU. These provisions were introduced in order to ensure that 
certain decisions concerning interests, policy priorities, or governance design continue to be 
taken at the national level. A similar conservatory role is played by the rules which allow the 
Member States to derogate from their EU obligations, or apply for an opt-out.
24
 Local 
decision-making is favoured by other provisions as well, such as that permitting the 
“switching off” of core Treaty rules in order to protect Member State public services (Art. 
106(2) TFEU), or those allowing for differentiation (flexibility) among the Member States in 
matters concerning their obligations.
25
 The law explicitly recognises the discretion and the 
autonomy of Member States to make policy choices and regulate matters themselves in fields 
where the EU’s competences are limited.26 
Having established the above-described analytical framework, it becomes possible to 
depart from idealistic legal accounts of the interplay between local interests and EU legal 
obligations. Clearly, more fundamental considerations are in play than those captured by the 
interpretation that Member State interests and EU obligations are engaged in an incessant 
process of balancing, in which the Court of Justice’s task is to create a fair and reasonable 
balance between them.
27
 The dilemmas addressed in this article, in particular those arising 
from the constant necessity of validation for EU law’s interference in every instance, which 
could concern the choice between legitimate and illegitimate Member State interests or the 
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 See the analysis in the next section. 
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 See C-D. Ehlermann, How Flexible is Community Law? An Unusual Approach to the Concept of “Two 
Speeds”, 82 Michigan Law Review 1274 (1984), and G. de Búrca, supra note 16, p. 133. The most relevant 
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 See Micklitz & de Witte, supra note 2. 
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 J. Schwarze, Die Abwägung von Zielen der europäischen Integration und mitgliedstaatliche Interessen in 
der Rechtsprechung des EUGH, Europarecht 253 (2013), p. 273, suggests that the convenient solution would be 
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(balance) between the requirements of EU membership and the interests of the Member States. See also the 
overview of the corresponding literature in Bartolini, supra note 2, pp. 406-407, which strongly criticises these 
balanced academic positions, arguing that EU legal obligations “have largely reduced the adaptation elasticity 
offered to Member States”, p. 407. He also states that constraint (leverage) and compliance are central to the 
functional offerings of the EU for the Member States, which, however, can also resort to EU law when seeking 
opportunities for utilising EU policy tools so as to address national policy concerns (ibidem, pp. 305-306). 
  
decision to moderate local interests and the relevant national decision-making processes,
28
 are 
similar to those raised by Azoulai as regards the respecting of “sensitive national interests” by 
the Court.
29
 Our analysis will demonstrate that the Court’s task is not simply the 
“desensitization” of sensitive national interests addressed under the EU law framework. Its 
engagement using EU legal provisions goes beyond that of simply compelling national 
political actors and policies to unquestioningly integrate “European legal parameters” into 




2. Engaging with Member State interests: Examples from the Single Market 
The questions concerning the legitimacy of EU law’s interferences with Member States’ 
interests are perhaps most acutely raised in the law of the Single Market. In the policy and 
regulatory conflicts generated by the fundamental freedoms and their implementing 
legislation, the legal obligations of the Member States and their particular interests, often 
formulated in contravention of those obligations, interact particularly intensively. While the 
scrutiny of Member State interests can, in most cases, rely on clear and unconditional Treaty 
provisions and numerous detailed legislative rules which express concrete commitments by 
the Member States, EU legal provisions are nevertheless very often confronted with interests 
that are deeply embedded in the local socio-economic environment and/or are implemented 
under national competences or in the discretion of national authorities. These interests, and 
their implementation in national law, enjoy a high degree of legitimacy, which means that EU 
law’s engagement with them necessitates the availability of a clear and sufficient mandate. 
EU law interacts with the Member State interests primarily in the context of assessing 
national restrictions on the fundamental freedoms. Their justification in law involves 
examining the proportionality of the national measure and/or the national policy action being 
challenged, in the course of which the Court of Justice, which usually decides such cases, has 
the competence to filter and/or moderate those interests, and potentially to transform them. 
The Court’s performance in this regard has been subject to intensive criticism, mainly for 
failing to observe the boundaries of its mandate.
31
 It has been claimed that there has been a 
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 See the carefully constructed legal reasoning in Case C-177/94 Criminal proceedings against Gianfranco 
Perfili, EU:C:1996:24, paras. 10-15. 
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 See L. Azoulai, The European Court of Justice and the Duty to Respect Sensitive National Interests, in: B. 




 See Azoulai’s criticisms of instances when EU law was responsive to locally formulated interests, and also 
when it trivialised Member State efforts to defend sensitive national interests (Azoulai, supra note 29, pp. 168-
  
“hemming in” of the derogation possibilities – which are available in EU law to protect 
legitimate local interests – via imposing ever more wide-ranging requirements and principles, 
which has had the consequence of putting EU law firmly in charge of deciding which Member 
State interests may be raised and how they may be protected.
32
 Others have argued that the 
strict scrutiny of national measures under the fundamental freedoms is propelled by a “prior 
assumption” that market integration as a core EU “value” must be given a strong weight “in 
the balance”, which means that market integration is regularly prioritised over “state 
sovereignty”.33 It has also been highlighted, from the perspective of the failing social 
dimension of the Single Market, that not all local interests are internalised adequately or in a 




2.1. Filtering Member State interests 
In the law of the Single Market, the first interaction with Member State interests occurs 
when the interests which can be pursued legitimately under the EU framework are separated 
from those which cannot.
35
 This filtering of Member State interests already raises 
controversies from the perspective of the legitimacy of the EU’s intervention.36 First of all, 
according to standard case law the Member States are not allowed to justify their actions on 
                                                                                                                                                        
187). Significant differences in the treatment of Member State interests have also been pointed out in the 
different strands of the jurisprudence as developed by the Court (ibidem). See further G. Davies, Free Movement, 
the Quality of Life and the Myth that the Court Balances Interests, in: P. Koutrakos, N. Nic Shuibhne, P. Syrpis 
(eds.), Exceptions from EU Free Movement Law, Hart Publishing, Oxford: 2016, pp. 218-219. 
32
 C. Barnard, Derogations, Justifications and the Four Freedoms: Is State Interest Really Protected?, in: C. 
Barnard, O. Odudu (eds.), The Outer Limits of European Union Law, Hart Publishing, Oxford: 2009, pp. 273 and 
289. The close scrutiny exercised by the Court of Justice allowed for the conclusion that “state interest is not, in 
fact, being protected by the justification jurisprudence” (ibidem). 
33
 G. A. Bermann, Proportionality and Subsidiarity, in: C. Barnard, J. Scott (eds.), The Law of the Single 
European Market, Hart Publishing: Oxford: 2002, pp. 76-77. See also J. Scott, Mandatory or Imperative 
Requirements in the EU and the WTO, in: Barnard & Scott (ibidem), p. 270. 
34
 C. Kaupa, Maybe Not Activist Enough? On the Court’s Alleged Neoliberal Bias in its Recent Labor Cases, 
in: de Witte et al., supra note 29, pp. 57-58, where he argued that the most relevant reason for this is the lack of 
an “operational framework” before the Court to assess and deal with the socio-economic conflicts at stake. See 
further C. Kaupa, The Pluralist Character of the European Economic Constitution, Hart Publishing, Oxford: 
2016. 
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political preferences represented by national governments (e.g. domestic partisanship, political obstructionism, 
national profiteering), de Búrca, supra note 16, pp. 135-136. 
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 It has been remarked, in this context, that EU law’s choices can be compromised by the usage of uncertain 
and “slippery” terms, which enable the moving of boundaries, or by the dressing up Member State preferences, 
local policy priorities and national commercial advantages as objective interests, see W. Wallace and H. 
Wallace, Flying Together in a Larger and More Diverse EU, Netherlands Scientific Council for Government 
Working Documents No. W 87 1995. 
  
the basis that the “national interest” in general requires protection. The Court of Justice will 
reject such claims on the grounds that they aim to secure a blanket justification for Member 
State policies which violate EU requirements, and that they are too general and 
unsubstantiated in their content to qualify as transparent, clear and certain, and non-
discriminatory representations of legitimate local interests.
37
 Member States’ claims for the 
protection of their “national interest” frequently relate to national policies which are poorly 
explained and equally poorly designed, which pursue objectives that are either invalid or lack 
objectivity, or which are implemented using inadequately targeted, excessive, or unsuitable 
means.
38
 However, the Court of Justice must make its distinctions carefully, as particular 
circumstances may require that national governments act in the national interest in a manner 
which does not comply with the benchmarks that seem to be applicable to normal governance 
situations. It must also be borne in mind that they alone bear political responsibility for these 
actions. It is also uncertain whether legal scrutiny, as implemented by the Court of Justice, 
will be able to make defendable distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate 
manifestations of the local interest, especially in situations wherein they are rather crudely 
expressed political desires covered with a light veneer of native unilateralism.
39
 
The case law also excludes the unilateral advancement of “purely economic” interests40 
by the Member States, which raises similar concerns about the boundaries of EU law’s 
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for a decision approving national policy, and the judgment in Case C-271/09 Commission v Poland, 
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39
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Westfalen, EU:C:2007:438; Case C-158/07 Jacqueline Förster v Hoofddirectie van de Informatie Beheer Groep, 
EU:C:2008:630) may allow, in particular circumstances, for the recognition of Member State practices as 
legitimate which otherwise would qualify as illegitimate on account of the territorially-linked, possibly 
protectionist aims pursued by them. 
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 E.g. interests which relate to the financial interests of the Member State concerned or to the development 
of the national economy. See Case C-367/98 Commission v Portugal, EU:C:2002:326, para. 52; Case C-35/98 
Staatssecretaris van Financiën v B.G.M. Verkooijen, EU:C:2000:294, para. 47; and in the context of the free 
movement of goods, Case C-265/95 Commission v France, EU:C:1997:595, para. 62; and as to the free 
movement of services, Case C-398/95 Syndesmos ton en Elladi Touristikon kai Taxidiotikon Grafeion v 
Ypourgos Ergasias, EU:C:1997:282, para. 23 and Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de 
l’emploi (ONEm), EU:C:2011:124, para. 52. Purely (national) economic interests may also fail the requirements 
imposed during moderation by EU law under the proportionality test, as they may be extremely broad as a matter 
  
intervention. The Court has consistently denied that aims such as reinforcing the structure and 
operation of competitive markets at the national level, the modernisation of national markets, 
or increasing the effectiveness of national markets could be legitimately protected in 
opposition to the fundamental freedoms.
41
 The Member States will also be prevented from 
relying – when interfering with the operation of competitive markets – on considerations of 
expediency that arise from the general state of a given sector of the national economy.
42
 The 
rationale for barring such claims is that they concern the interests of a single national 
economy within the Single Market, and have a clear potential for disadvantaging the 
economies of other Member States as well as undermining the Union’s own economic policy. 
Allowing national governments to defend “purely economic” interests would not only pose a 
threat to the competitive equality of the Member States, but would also directly jeopardise the 
multilateral economic arrangement that is the Single Market.
43
 
The Court needs to carefully reflect when making these choices, and pay close attention 
to what makes a local interest “purely” economic. Many of the economic interests raised by 
the Member States may only have indirect links with a Member State’s competitive position, 
and when examined closely it may turn out that their non-economic policy dimension (e.g. 
public health, public security, media pluralism etc.) may, in the national context, be more 
prevalent.
44
 A narrow assessment by the Court may fail to acknowledge the recognisable 
social and industrial policy implications of the economic interest raised (e.g. the protection of 
                                                                                                                                                        
of substance, reduce the transparency and accessibility of policy-making, or offer uncontrollably broad discretion 
at the national level. 
41
 Case C-367/98 Commission v Portugal, para 52; Case C-174/04 Commission v Italy, EU:C:2005:350, para. 
37; Case C-274/06 Commission v Spain, EU:C:2008:06, para. 44, in which the strengthening of the structure of 
competition meant reinforcing the ability of the market to resist anti-competitive practices. 
42
 Case C-162/06 International Mail Spain SL v Administración del Estado and Correos, EU:C:2007:681, 
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43
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Barnard, supra note 32, p. 274. 
44
 See, inter alia, Case C-294/00 Deutsche Paracelsus Schulen für Naturheilverfahren GmbH v Kurt 
Gräbner, EU:C:2002:442, para. 43; Case 96/85 Commission v France, EU:C:1986:189, para. 10; Case C-351/90 
Commission v Luxembourg, para. 13; Case C-108/96 Criminal proceedings against Dennis Mac Quen, Derek 
Pouton, Carla Godts, Youssef Antoun and Grandvision Belgium SA, EU:C:2001:67, para. 30; Case C-117/97 
Commission v Spain, EU:C:1998:519, paras. 36-38 and 45-46; Case C-148/91 Vereniging Veronica Omroep 
Organisatie v Commissariaat voor de Media, EU:C:1993:45, para. 9. When the economically relevant Member 
State interest in question coincides with the relevant EU policy objectives (e.g. protecting public service values, 
promoting regional development, or strengthening innovation), this can further decrease EU law’s mandate for 
intervention. See Case C-209/98 Entreprenørforeningens Affalds/Miljøsektion (FFAD) v Københavns Kommune, 
EU:C:2000:279, paras. 78-80; Case 36/73 Nederlandse Spoorwegen v Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 




 In the case of non-economic interests, a similar judicial scrutiny may 
overlook their significant commercial implications (e.g. the protection of national 
cinematographic culture, the protection of the national film industry, or the protection of small 
printed media).
46
 Also, there is a particularly fine line – especially in terms of the legal 
assessment – between the Member States being unwilling to sacrifice domestic resources for 
the implementation of EU policies on the grounds of purely economic interests, and the claim 
that a departure from EU obligations is justified by the interests of economy and efficiency in 
administration and governance at the national level.
47
 
In the event there is a strong and clear legal mandate, the Court of Justice can act more 
confidently when filtering Member State interests. For example, Art. 18 TFEU provides a 
solid basis for separating discriminatory Member State measures and policies from those 
which refrain from discriminating on the basis of nationality or establishment. The same 
Treaty article also makes it possible to limit the grounds available to justify such measures 
and subject them to a particularly exacting scrutiny under the proportionality principle.
48
 In 
contrast, when the EU lacks the competences to act in a particular policy domain, the filtering 
of Member State interests will be more confined. This is expressed first and foremost in the 
general formula which states that – having regard to the state of EU law at the time and in the 
absence of necessary EU legislative measures – the Member States are entitled (i.e. “remain 
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368/95 Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags- und vertriebs GmbH v Heinrich Bauer Verlag, 
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Rhiannon Morgan v Bezirksregierung Köln, EU:C:2007:626; Case C-8/02 Ludwig Leichtle v Bundesanstalt für 
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EU:C:2004:128. 
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EU:C:1984:335, para. 10; Case C-351/90 Commission v Luxembourg, para. 14; Case 96/85 Commission v 
France, EU:C:1986:189, para. 12. 
  
competent”; “have the power”) to regulate national policy matters affected by EU obligations, 
for example access to social security entitlements, the criterion for taxation, criminal law, 




2.2 Moderating and transforming Member State interests 
The fundamental freedoms impose direct and legally enforceable restrictions on Member 
States in their pursuit of their respective interests. The law, as applied, subjects Member State 
interests to rather intensive moderation, which may even lead to the eventual transformation 
of those interests in the national political arena. Under the principle of proportionality, the 
central legal principle for deciding whether Member States can legitimately depart from the 
fundamental freedoms in pursuit of locally defined interests Member States are required to 
demonstrate that their national policy intervention is based on a genuine need, is suitable for 
attaining the relevant local interest(s), and does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve 
them. In general terms, the proportionality principle gives effect to the assumption that 
national governments, when acting under their political mandates in areas covered by the 
rules on free movement, will use the least restrictive means possible.
50
 While, on average, it 
serves as an effective instrument in judicial decision-making, in controversial instances, for 
example when a choice between competing values or policy objectives of the same 
importance needs to be made, the legitimacy of the judicial assessment and the decision-
making it enables becomes more dubious.
51
 
Considering its directness and intensity, in order to ensure the legitimacy of any 
interference with locally-defined interests it is of paramount importance to examine the 
proportionality of the related Member State (policy) action. The choices made with respect to 
the application of the proportionality test must be principled and stay within the boundaries of 
the mandate provided under EU law. The legitimacy of controls over national policies 
naturally raises less controversy when such controls are carried out under an EU legal 
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 See, inter alia, Case C-15/90 David Maxwell Middleburgh v Chief Adjudication Officer, EU:C:1991:377, 
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The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law, 16 European Law Journal 158 (2010). 
  
provision which sets out Member State obligations clearly, based on a manifest agreement 
among the Member States as to the interests and objectives to be achieved. Such legal 
provisions include the EU non-discrimination principle, both on its own or as implemented 
through the fundamental freedoms,
52
 or a clearly expressed rule in a piece of EU legislation 
agreed to by the Member State. In instances when the application of EU requirements in the 
specific circumstances is less certain, or interference with national policies and policy 
action(s) lacks a detailed legal basis, the engagement of EU law with Member State interests 
must demonstrate self-restraint. 
Under the principle of proportionality, EU law imposes requirements such as that 
Member State actions pursuing local interests must relate to a particular purpose and objective 
(i.e. they must be targeted at achieving a particular objective); must pursue genuine policy 
objectives that are determined clearly and transparently in advance; must be limited to what is 
necessary to achieve the policy objectives identified; and must avoid the use of excessive 
administrative discretion.
53
 It may further be demanded that the realisation of local interests 
be carried out with due regard for the fundamental requirements of accessible and transparent 
regulation and comply with formal rule of law requirements. The latter include, in particular, 
the requirements that the legal position of the individuals affected is determined with 
precision and clarity, that adequate information on the rights and obligations of the persons 
affected is provided, that effective judicial protection and remedies are available, and that the 
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 It, nevertheless, needs to be applied with restraint as it is capable of excluding a broad range of Member 
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effects of the applicable measures and policies are delimited in law adequately (objectively).
54
 
This set of principles places serious limitations as to which local interest and under what 
circumstances, as pursued by the Member States, may be accepted under EU law. As a result, 
Member States seeking approval for their policies under EU law may have to transform 
national processes and frameworks which were put in place for the formulation and the 
realisation of local interests.
55
 
The legitimacy of EU law’s intervention under these requirements depends foremost on 
the intensity of the legal scrutiny and how it is calibrated in the circumstances of a given case. 
The controls imposed under the proportionality principle depend on numerous factors, such as 
the nature of the EU competence affected, the scope of the Member State competence 
involved, and/or the availability, as well as the nature, of EU regulatory and harmonisation 
efforts in the given domain.
56
 Arguably, when focusing on these elements of the law, the 
Court of Justice (and national courts) in effect explore whether intervention with the Member 
State interest in question has been legitimised by the availability of a prior political agreement 
at the EU level expressed in some form of law. When the EU’s competences are limited and 
EU legislative efforts have been restricted, or where the relevant policy objectives (or values) 
are expected to be secured within Member State competences, Member State interests and the 
corresponding local policies will be accorded a rather broad leeway.
57
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The Court of Justice’s case law offers a number of examples of such restrained scrutiny 
of the national interests pursued and the relevant national policy frameworks. In the early 
electricity market liberalisation judgments, the Court recognised – as a matter of principle – 
that a broad discretion was available to the Member States when they interfere in a market 
which is essentially a public service market, in pursuit of both national public service 
objectives as well as the related local economic, fiscal, social etc. policy objectives.
58
 In those 
instances where a Member State’s action in the national public service market effectively 
complemented the EU’s policy efforts in the social domain, especially when the operation of 
fundamental public services and the meeting of fundamental social needs were under threat,
59
 
the Court again opted for a light-touch review of the Member State’s interests and demanded 




In other circumstances, the legitimacy of EU law’s engagement with locally-rooted 
interests may be much more uncertain. The case law dealing with the fundamental political 
choice that certain activities in what is perceived as a market must be provided on a not-for-
profit basis introduced requirements towards Member State actions which may be difficult to 
link with a clear mandate under EU law expressing an unquestionable political agreement 
among the Member States. The requirements imposed by the Court in Sodemare included, in 
particular, that choices made in the local interest must follow from a logical and sound policy 
decision, which was made without discrimination at the national level, and that the policy 
objectives formulated by the national government must be genuine and must “necessarily” 
imply that the expectation of a not-for-profit operation can be enforced in the particular local 
circumstances.
61
 As a further demand, national policy-makers must ensure that the not-for-
profit nature of the activity forms part of a national policy framework which promotes and 
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protects genuine non-economic objectives and which is operated under genuine non-economic 
principles and in circumstances which exclude for-profit operations.
62
 
While some of the Sodemare requirements, such as non-discrimination, may find a solid 
basis in clear and specific EU legal provisions, others have the potential to unjustifiably 
narrow down national policy choices and excessively interfere with their actual 
implementation. For example, the strict demand for policy coherence at the national level, 
which was presumably introduced by the Court of Justice to ensure that the Member States do 
not abuse the not-for-profit label to secure illegitimate advantages in the Single Market, is 
difficult to connect to an actual provision or principle of EU law, and may be impossible to 
satisfy, when interpreted strictly, in an actual policy setting and in an actual market where 
considerable uncertainties prevail. However, the judgment in Sodemare is also capable of 
being read in a more forgiving manner. It seems that the Court, quite consistent with its light-
touch jurisprudence, will readily defer to the national policy process and the interests 
represented therein provided that the local interest of a not-for-profit (non-commercial) 
operation is sufficiently embedded in domestic non-economic policies and is adequately 




The legitimacy of EU law’s engagement with local interests is perhaps the weakest when 
the proportionality principle is applied with a view to demanding from the Member States that 
they adopt less restrictive alternative measures which are nonetheless sufficiently effective to 
ensure the realisation of the policy objectives pursued.
64
 The root of the problem here is that 
the requirement of less restrictive national policy alternatives aims explicitly at delimiting 
Member State choices. It also interferes rather directly with the domestic policy-process 
whereby the instruments for policy-implementation are selected. As a more specific issue 
concerning the power of the Court of Justice and its scope, the assessment of potential 
alternative measures, no matter how abstract it may be, seems to be a matter for the domestic 
policy-maker and the national legislature.
65
 In practice, however, the application of this limb 
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of the proportionality test by the Court of Justice is circumscribed by the limitations of the 
judicial mandate available under EU law. The scrutiny is carried out, and its intensity set, with 
regard to the circumstances of the given case, which involves an assessment of the relevant 
factors from the perspective of the legitimacy of EU law’s interference with local interests. 
Such factors include, in particular, the scope of the EU competences available as well as the 
nature and scope of the relevant national policy action.
66
 As a clear example of a constrained 
scrutiny, in the earlier-mentioned electricity market rulings – where the national government 
was held entitled to make the most fundamental policy choices – the Court ruled that the 
assessment of potential, less restrictive alternative measures must not be purely speculative 
and must take place having regard to the specificities of the domestic public service market.
67
 
Under the proportionality principle, EU law may demand from the Member States – as 
alternative instruments that are less restrictive than the enforcement of strict legal prohibitions 
or the imposition of additional administrative burdens – the introduction and operation of 
alternative user-friendly administrative solutions
68
 or administrative supervision 
arrangements.
69
 These solutions can rely on a particularly strong source of legitimacy when 
the Member States have made common, legally-binding commitments to the same effect. 
Arguably, the Treaty provisions on the fundamental freedoms may themselves provide a 
sufficient mandate, as their underlying objective is to liberate cross-border economic activities 
from excessive regulatory and administrative constraints.
70
 The availability of EU legislation, 
which regulates cross-border cooperation avenues among the Member States so that economic 
operators can avoid restrictive national administrative and regulatory frameworks, only 
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reinforces the force of these Treaty rules.
71
 In contrast, when the alternative trader-friendly 
instrument entails the introduction of market-based solutions, such as resorting to private law 
arrangements or solutions which do not restrict the choices of the individuals (market 
operators) affected,
72
 the legitimacy of EU law’s interference, which assumes the existence of 
a common agreement among the Member States, is less obvious. The same holds true for 
imposing the requirement under the proportionality principle that Member States, instead of 
imposing direct legal prohibitions on individuals, should regulate the risks associated with the 
conduct in question,
73
 resort to risk mitigation solutions,
74




Overall, the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice concerning the proportionality of policy 
actions adopted by the Member States in the pursuit of locally-formulated interests includes 
obvious, as well as controversial, instances of judicial interference. Even the minimum 
requirements enforced, such as the clarity of legal rules or the genuineness and coherence of 
the domestic policy framework, have the potential for moderating the processes of national 
policy-making and the realisation of local interests. The law has made clear what domestic 
practices are preferred and what may qualify as unacceptable. The scrutiny under EU law may 
also involve the transformation of how Member State interests are formulated and realised in 
the national domain. This may manifest itself through the requirement of a less restrictive 
alternative solution, the application of which may lead to changing the policy direction 
pursued by the Member State concerned. In every case, the legitimacy of EU law’s 
engagement with Member State interests depends first and foremost on whether it can point to 
a common agreement among the Member States as expressed in a provision of law, lacking 
which the political opportunity, as well as the responsibility for realising their interests, must 
remain with national governments. 
 
Conclusions 
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The political legitimacy enjoyed by Member State interests, fed into the EU integration 
framework as its fundamental building blocks and also as the political limitations of the 
common policies developed and operated therein, requires that their treatment under EU law 
relies on a clear source of legitimacy. The legitimacy for EU law’s interferences flows first 
foremost from the prior agreements among the Member States, which are expressed in general 
and specific provisions of law, to achieve particular common (policy) objectives as they 
emerge from the interests they share. However, the mandate thus provided for EU law, as well 
as its boundaries, requires constant examination and validation when applied in individual 
cases by the Court of Justice or by national courts. This is particularly true for the law of the 
Single Market, where local interests are filtered and moderated, and may even be transformed, 
under the proportionality principle. The choices taken with regard to the local interests 
represented must be defended in judicial reasoning. The judicial decisions must demonstrate 
that they understand the legitimacy dilemmas caused by the fundamental circumstance that 
the interests raised by the Member States are the products of a national political processes and 
respond to specific local needs. 
